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AN INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILITY
LITIGATION AND A VIEW TO THE FUTURE
MICHAEL B. GERRARD*
JOSEPH A. MACDOUGALD**
This article discusses the advancement of climate change litigation. It
explores two approaches to climate change litigation; the first is to use the
federal regulatory apparatus and the second is to use the tort system. The
article explores key questions in climate change litigation such as, who is
responsible for deciding the appropriate level of harmful emissions? How
should courts handle the long tail effects of climate change? What are the
proper forums to litigate in? And, what is the role of the federal
government in climate change litigation?
Climate change liability litigation is a United States phenomenon.
Though climate related litigation exists in other countries,' more climate
change cases have been brought in the United States than in the rest of the
world combined, and the United States stands alone in seeing significant
litigation that seeks to hold greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters liable for the
harms caused by climate change.
The first wave of climate liability litigation began in the mid-
2000's during President George W. Bush's administration. Frustrated by
the absence of a national climate change regulatory scheme in the United
States, climate liability litigation began as environmental groups sought to
compel policy development through two litigation avenues. One approach
was to use the existing United States legal and regulatory apparatus to
*Michael B. Gerrard is the Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice
and Director of the Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School, as
well as Senior Counsel to Arnold & Porter LLP.
**Joseph Allan MacDougald is a Professor in Residence and Executive
Director of the Center for Energy & Environmental Law (CEEL) at the University
of Connecticut School of Law. He would like to extend his thanks to the CEEL
Research Assistant, Kathleen Coss (JD Candidate 2014) for all of her hard work
and research for this article.
1 A collection of non-U.S. climate litigation can be found at http://web.
law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/non-us-climate-change-litigation-chart (last
visited Aug. 24, 2013). See also CLIMATE CHANGE LIABILYTY: TRANSNATIONAL LAW
AND PRACTICE (Richard Lord et al., eds., 2012).
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address rising GHG emissions. The second approach was to use the tort
system to seek monetary or injunctive relief from the largest emitters of
GHGs, such as coal fired power plant operators, and the manufacturers of
emitting equipment, such as automobile companies.
This article introduces both approaches through their leading cases.
It also serves as an introduction to a volume arising from an October 2012
conference at the University of Connecticut School of Law, Climate
Change Risks & Liability - The Future of Insurance & Litigation. It is
adapted in part from Michael Gerrard's morning keynote address to that
conference.
Now is a remarkable time in the nearly decade long history of this
topic. As of the writing of this article, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed its first regulatory framework for
GHGs from coal fired power plants as anticipated by the Supreme Court's
rulings in this area. Many of the liability cases discussed at the October
2012 conference came to their procedural end only by June 2013. However,
this subsequent litigation history only serves to reinforce the view of the
future and questions presented at the end of the conference and recounted
here.
A. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA - ENGAGING THE EPA
One avenue of climate litigation is to invoke the existing
environmental laws to address climate change. Following this plan of
attack, a collection of states, municipalities, non-profits, and land trusts
filed a set of rulemaking petitions with EPA. These petitions sought to
establish GHGs as air pollutants under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 2 The
administrative and court cases around this strategy culminated in 2007 in
the landmark decision from the United State Supreme Court of
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter Mass v.
EPA).
The CAA requires the EPA Administrator to set emissions
standards for any air pollutant from stationary or mobile sources that
contributes to air pollution that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
the public health or welfare."4 While the case presented to the Court
sprang from the part of the CAA that addressed mobile sources of pollution,
Respondents made clear at oral argument that a ruling in their favor would
establish CO2 as a pollutant under the CAA for the purpose of regulating
not only motor vehicles, but also stationary sources (of which the largest
category is coal fired power plants).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 - 7671 (2006).
3 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
4 42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a)(1) (2006).
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In initially responding to the rulemaking requests, EPA adopted the
position that it should not regulate GHGs as air pollutants as a result of
various policy considerations.
The Agency's rationale was based on several considerations '
including, among others, the assertion that since GHG emissions were the
subject of international negotiations by the Executive Branch, regulatory
development by the EPA would disrupt these delicate, international
proceedings. In disagreement, twelve States, several United States cities,
and land trusts' brought suit. In March of 2007, the Supreme Court, by a
vote of 5 to 4, held that carbon dioxide and other GHGs are within the
definition of air pollutant under the Clean Air Act and that EPA does
indeed have the authority to regulate them.7 Subsequent to the decision, the
EPA under the Obama administration did indeed issue a two-part
endangerment finding, concluding that rising GHG levels endanger public
health, safety, and welfare.8 Thereafter, the EPA began issuing substantive
regulations to restrict GHG emissions.
s At oral argument, Justice Breyer made much of EPA's considerations
(plural). As the agency attempted to argue that there were legitimate grounds
throughout their responses that would be consistent with administrative deference
provided by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), Justice Breyer noted that their responses consistently integrated all
considerations including a separation of powers argument involving international
negotiations. For those interested in such matters, the oral argument, easily found
on websites such as oyez.org, represents high theater for listeners. "JUSTICE
BREYER: If they write that all of these considerations justify our result, again, one
of them by themselves, it sounds, they think would not have been sufficient."
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT
CHICAGO KENT COLLEGE OF LAW (Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.oyez.org
/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006 05 1120/.
6 The inclusion of land trusts in the litigation was strategic and presented itself
in the briefing and oral arguments for the case. Land trusts hold an unusual
position as large landowners who have a declared public purpose for stewardship
of the land.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007).
8 Little happened for the balance of the Bush Presidency except that EPA
issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. When President Obama took
office, however, the agency began acting very quickly, promulgating the
Endangerment Finding required under the Clean Air Act and triggering EPA's
authority to regulate GHGs as pollutants that endanger the public as defined by the
CAA, and served as the formal finding that greenhouse gases do indeed cause a
danger to public health and welfare. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute
Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed.
Reg. 66,495 (Dec. 15, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 81, 63). That finding is
the basis for all further GHG regulations under the CAA. Next, the Obama
administration introduced a period of active climate regulation in the United States,
2013 155
156 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
B. NUISANCE LAW AND TORT LITIGATION - TYING EMITTERS TO
CLIMATE CHANGE'S CONSEQUENCES
In parallel to Mass v. EPA, four lawsuits sought redress from large
scale GHG emitters under various nuisance law theories.9 These cases
were Connecticut v. American Electric Power,'0 California v. General
Motors Corporation," Comer v. Mur hy Oil USA,' and Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation.
Connecticut v. American Electric Power (hereinafter Connecticut)
was filed in 2004 by eight states, New York City, and three land trusts,
against five major electric utilities that cumulatively burned a substantial
amount of coal and released a significant amount of GHG emissions.14
This lawsuit sought injunctive relief from the Southern District of New
York. It asked the district judge to issue an abatement order mandating that
these companies' power plants reduce their GHG emissions by specific
amounts each year.' 5 In addition to being the first lawsuit of its kind,
Connecticut stands out for being the only such case that sought injunctive
relief instead of money damages.' 6
In California v. General Motors Corporation, California sued
several of the major automakers over the GHG emissions produced by
vehicles they manufactured.17 California alleged that these pollutants were
causing injury to the State, its coastline and other harms. The case sought
monetary relief. 1
Comer v. Murphy Oil (hereinafter Comer) was filed in Mississippi
on behalf of many property owners against thirty or so chemical companies,
which invited counter-response litigating from industries and states alleging
overregulation by the EPA.
Maxine Burkett, Legal Rights and Remedies, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION
TO CLIMATE CHANGE 815, 824-25 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds.,
2012).
10 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009),
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) [hereinafter Connecticut].
" California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. WL
2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
12 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 1:05-CV436-LG-RHW, 2007 WL 6942285
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev'd, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Comer v. Murphy
Oil USA, 839 F.Supp.2d 849 (2012), aff'd, 718 F.3d. 460 (2013).
1 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009), affd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
14 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 309; Burkett, supra note 9, at 825.
15 Connecticut, 582 F.3d at 309; Burkett, supra note 9, at 826.
16 See Burkett, supra note 9, at 827.
' California, 2007 WL 2726871 at *1.
'
8id
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oil companies, and others. 9 The plaintiffs alleged that the property damage
caused by Hurricane Katrina had been exacerbated, and the Hurricane's
power enhanced, by climate change. The plaintiffs further alleged that the
defendants' emissions had substantially worsened that change. The case
sought money damages in the amount of the additional property damage
that they had suffered as a result.2 0
Finally, Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corporation (hereinafter Kivalina),
which serves as the keystone case for this journal issue, was filed on behalf
of the remote Alaskan Village of Kivalina that, according to their
complaint, had been severely damaged by the effects of global climate
change. The village, located on a narrow isthmus, was once protected from
violent spring and fall storms by a natural sea ice barrier. As the climate
has warmed, wave action and loss of ice eroded this safeguard. Rising
temperatures meant that the natural ice barriers formed later and later in the
season, leaving the village exposed to the harsh fall storms and currents.
This exposure created even further erosion, destroying the subaquatic
protective sand bars and barriers. Alleging that a large number of fossil fuel
companies, chemical companies and others exacerbated the climate change
that will ultimately force the Kivalina villagers to relocate, the Village
sued these companies for several hundred million dollars in money
damages to cover the associated costs.2 1
Each of these four original lawsuits was dismissed at the district
court level on grounds that it raised a non-justiciable political question and
each was appealed.2 2 These district courts all held that issues of global
warming policy were not suitable for adjudication by the courts, but rather
more appropriately decided by the Congress and by the Executive
Branch.23 Some courts found other preclusive basis for dismissal, such as
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their claim. 24
The notice of appeal for California v. General Motors Corporation
was filed in the Ninth Circuit at the same time the automobile industry
found itself deeply embedded in financial trouble. The highly publicized
government bailout of the automobile industry brought an end to this case
19 Comer, 2007 WL 6942285 at *1.20 id.
21 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) affd, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012). Michael Gerrard was formerly a
partner, and is currently Senior Counsel, in the law firm of Arnold & Porter LLP,
which represented a defendant in Comer and a defendant in Kivalina. He has
written this article purely in his academic capacity.
22 Burkett, supra note 9, at 824 n.110. For background on the political
question doctrine, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
23 Burkett, supra note 9, at 824 n. 110.
24 Id at 824.
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by including, as a term of the settlement among the Obama Administration,
the automobile industry and the State of California, that the lawsuit be
dropped.2 5
The Comer case enjoyed a more colorful and much less common
procedural history. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, a three-judge panel
reversed the decision upon finding that the case was not, in fact, barred by
the political question doctrine, and reinstated the case to the district court
for further proceedings.26 The defendants moved for an en banc hearing, to
which the full court issued a decision granting that right and vacating the
decision below.27 The very day that briefs were due to the en banc court,
though, it announced that it had lost a quorum.28 Presumably due to the
great number of defendants and the judges' ownership of stocks of some of
them, enough judges had recused themselves that the case could no longer
be heard en banc. There was, however, a quorum at the time that the panel
decision was vacated. Thus the case was remanded to the district court, but
since it had previously been dismissed at that level, the case was over.29
The court did provide plaintiffs with the right to apply for certiorari to the
Supreme Court, but instead they applied for a writ of mandamus,
requesting that the Fifth Circuit be ordered to decide the case. The
Supreme Court declined the plaintiffs' request and effectively ended that
version of the case. 30 The Comer case was subsequently re-filed3 1 and
dismissed by the District Court on many grounds including res judicata. In
May 2013, the Fifth Circuit confirmed that this refiling was barred by res
judicata. 32 The time for plaintiffs to petition the Supreme Court for
certiorari has now expired, so the Comer litigation appears to have ended.
The Connecticut case was argued in the Second Circuit in July
2005. It sat year after year without resolution.3 3 The absence of this
25 For a discussion of the overall settlement, see Jody Freeman, The Obama
Administration's National Auto Policy: Lessons from the "Car Deal," 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REv. 343 (2011).
26 Burkett, supra note 9, at 827.
27 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 598 F.3d 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2010), reh'g
granted en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
28 See Comer, 607 F.3d at 1055.
29 d
30 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), opinion vacated
pending reh'g en banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d
1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc), mandamus denied, No. 10-294 (Jan. 10,
2011); In re Comer, 131 S. Ct. 902 (2011); Burkett, supra note 9, at 827.
31 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012),
affd, 718 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. 2013).
32 id
3 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 582 F.3d 309, 385 (2d Cir. 2009),
rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
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decision had begun to emerge as one of the great mysteries in climate
change litigation. Finally in 2009, three and half years after the argument
was heard, the Second Circuit issued a decision and reversed, holding that
the case did not implicate the political question doctrine.3 4 (One of the
members of the Second Circuit panel that had heard argument, Sonia
Sotomayor, had been elevated to the Supreme Court and did not participate
in the Second Circuit decision.)
Upon the dispositions of Comer and Connecticut, where two
circuits held that the issue of liability for global climate change could
properly be considered by the courts, the defendants in Conn. v. AEP
applied for, and were granted, certiorari in December of 2010.35 In a
unanimous eight justice decision, with Justice Sotomayor recusing herself,
the Supreme Court reversed the appellate panel.3 6 The decision was written
by Justice Ginsberg and turned on Massachusetts v. EPA 's holding that
established the EPA's authority to regulate GHGs. Congress had decided
that it was the job of EPA, and therefore not the courts, to regulate GHG
emissions. The federal common law of nuisance for GHG emissions had
ultimately been displaced by the Clean Air Act, and these cases should
have been dismissed after all.
Kivalina was the last of these cases to be decided. As Connecticut
had been the only GHG nuisance law case to be decided by the Supreme
Court, 39 and in that case plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, the
Kivalina plaintiffs hoped their case was distinguishable since it claimed
money damages instead. In 2012, however, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the
Kivalina case, holding that the same rationale of displacement in the
Connecticut case applies to money damages as well.4 0 Finally, in the very
end of the 2012-2103 term, the Supreme Court denial of the Village of
Kivalina's petition for certiorari effectively ended the case's storied
history.
Although federal common law for greenhouse gas nuisance claims
has been displaced by federal regulation, there continues to be the
34 id
35 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, 131 S. Ct. 813 (Dec. 6, 2010) (No. 10-174).
36 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2011).
31See id. at 2537.
38 Burkett, supra note 9, at 825.
By contrast, Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497 (2007), was an
administrative law case regarding statutory construction and agency obligations.
40 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir.
2012).
41 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (May 20, 2013) (No. 12-1072).
2013 159
160 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
possibility of a state common law cause of action. 42 Such a claim was
appended to the Connecticut case, but the Supreme Court explicitly
declined the opportunity to address whether it could survive. The
Connecticut plaintiffs chose not to pursue this claim. Other plaintiffs may
press such a claim, but these or any similar claims face many significant
hurdles.
C. LESSONS FROM THE NUISANCE LAWSUITS
Collectively, the four cases discussed above all foundered on a
threshold barrier: separation of powers. Each of the cases has turned on
some variation of this constitutional issue. Whether sounding in political
question or displacement, the issue remains: whose job is it to decide how
much GHG emissions are too much? These cases found that the Congress
gave that job to EPA and that the courts therefore are without this power.
None of these cases progressed beyond that foundational point.
There was never any discovery or judicial fact-finding in any of these cases.
Presuming further advancement is even possible, it will likely be met with
an onslaught of additional obstacles. There would be a question of whether
the particular injury suffered is really attributable to climate change, a very
difficult and technical issue.43 In the case of Kivalina, this connection was
easier to argue. An Army Corps of Engineers analysis concluded that the
melting ice was directly related to a changing climate.44 Contrast this with
Comer, where the plaintiffs would have had the difficult task of proving
that Hurricane Katrina struck with a force augmented by global warming.
There is also the issue of how the law and courts should account
for the long time scales of climate change. GHGs may reside in the
atmosphere for a century or longer and, by their nature, spread rapidly and
evenly across the globe. The gasses residing in our atmosphere today are
the culmination of more than a century's worldwide pollution from many
countries. Unclear authority, common harm, long time spans separating the
injuries from the emission, and multiple emitters of varying sizes all
coalesce to show the difficulty the law has in attaching any single liability
to one particular defendant. As in Kivalina, additional defendants would
almost certainly be continuously joined in the litigation, resulting in a
potentially unlimited number of parties.
42 See Burkett, supra note 9, at 842 n. 143.
43 See Burkett, supra note 9, at 828-29. See generally Michael B. Gerrard,
What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 135 (2011).
" ALASKA DIST., U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, ALASKA VILLAGE EROSION
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 4-5, 23 (2006), available at
housemajority.org/coms/cli/AVETAReport.pdf.
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Additional hard questions arise from jurisdictional issues. How
does a U.S. court get personal jurisdiction over all emitting parties, many of
which are outside the United States? What about a state court? What is the
capacity for a state court in Mississippi to bring in the Chinese electric
power companies emitting C0 2? If admitted, what are the mechanisms for
enforcing the judgment? What set of laws apply? Would the laws of the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred prevail? Or rather the law where the
offending power plant is located? If the parent company owns plants in
several states, is it the law of each state that applies?
And finally, what is the federal government's role in such
litigation? The construction and use of coal-fired power plants, the use of
motor vehicles, and other practices that would emit greenhouse gasses have
all been a matter of United States government policy for decades. The
government subsidizes these activities, issues permits, builds interstate
highway systems, and leases federal lands for coal mining and oil drilling.
These greenhouse gas emitters are a central part of the economy, and
certainly the historical emissions were all blessed by the government at
some point, as evinced by the issued permits.
There is also a conceptual problem with liability concerning the
supply chain. The use of electricity generated from coal requires one party
to mine coal, one to transport it, another to burn it for electricity, a utility to
deliver that power, and finally a consumer to use the electricity. Where
along that supply chain does liability attach? The same issue arises with
car emissions. Somebody drills the oil, somebody else refines it and
another, or perhaps the same company, transports it to gas stations, where
people individually put it in their cars. In addition to this supply chain, cars
are also made by various manufacturers, and still additional people drive
them. Every one of these activities is lawful, and many government policies
and expenditures encourage them. Finally, is every injured community
going to bring its own lawsuit for individual adjudication of these issues?
All of these obstacles and more will need to be considered if any of these
cases are to proceed.
A separate line of cases was launched in 2011 by a non-profit
group called Our Children's Trust. These cases were all founded on the
common law doctrine of the public trust, in which certain features of the
natural world are held by the government in a public trust, and the
government is obligated to protect them, at least unless the relevant
legislature takes a different view. This doctrine had long been applied to
certain coastal waters, and in some jurisdictions to parkland. The 2011
cases sought to extend it to the atmosphere. The lawsuits were brought
against state and federal governments, and sought court orders that these
governments adopt and enforce plans to reduce GHG emissions so that the
atmosphere is preserved.
None of these cases has succeeded. The one that got furthest was in
Texas, where a judge found in July 2012 that a provision of the Texas
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constitution did include the atmosphere in the public trust; but less than a
month later the judge said that it was not the court's role to intrude on the
legislature's decisions as to environmental policy.4 5 The other cases were
dismissed on the grounds that the public trust doctrine does not extend to
the atmosphere, or that the doctrine of separation of powers does not allow
the courts to make policy decisions of the sort requested. 6
D. THE FUTURE OF CLIMATE LITIGATION
So what is the future of climate litigation? Despite the failure of
common law tort and public trust litigation against GHG emitters, from an
alternate perspective one can argue that climate litigation has been
extremely effective. Lawyers are struggling to find appropriate roles for
the courts in this difficult debate, where the legal apparatus was not even
previously engaged. While the claims attaching direct liability have
recently subsided, the legitimacy of climate change as a legal and
regulatory concern has been strengthened. In reviewing EPA actions
regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act, the courts have strongly
reaffirmed the legitimacy of EPA's role in the face of strong challenges
from industry and from states that oppose climate regulation.47 Further
EPA and state regulatory actions will surely be challenged in court by the
same forces, but the battles will concern administrative procedures and
statutory minutiae and not the underlying rationale behind protecting the
climate.
It is likely that we will soon see a new phase litigation over climate
change liability -- responsibility for adaptation to the effects of climate
change, such as sea level rise. This kind of litigation has a much greater
potential for success than common law litigation against GHG emitters, and
will involve a much different set of defendants.
Perhaps the story of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, or MRGO,
points the way to climate litigation's next phase. At issue in the case is a
channel that was constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers to facilitate
maritime travel to the Port of New Orleans, enabling passage so that ships
45 Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN- 11-002194,
2012 WL 2946041, at *1 (D. Tex. July 9, 2012); Bonser-Lain v. Tex. Comm'n on
Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1 (D. Tex. Aug. 2,
2012).
46 See, e.g., Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.D.C. 2012);
Barhaugh v. State, 264 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2011).
47 E.g., Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir.),
reh'g denied, 2012 WL 6621785, and reh'g en banc denied, 2012 WL 6681996
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom, Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA, 134 S.Ct. 418 (2013).
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could enter from the Gulf of Mexico without having to navigate through
the circuitous Mississippi River. When Hurricane Katrina came ashore,
however, the impact revealed that the Army Corps of Engineers had done a
very poor job of maintaining MRGO. Consequently, the channel had
become much larger. This widened channel facilitated the rapid delivery of
massive quantities of water, which overwhelmed dikes and levees in New
Orleans, and augmented the damage caused during the hurricane.
In Re: Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation 48 constituted the
numerous resulting lawsuits brought by homeowners and other parties
whose property had been damaged by the breaches of those levees. 49
According to a federal statute, flooding related to flood control projects
cannot be the basis of liability, but liability may attach to other projects,
including navigation projects. Thus, when trial was held in the District
Court of New Orleans on behalf of bellwether plaintiffs, the first question
asked was whether MRGO was a flood control project, or a navigation
project. The Court made a preliminary finding that MRGO was a
navigation project, and not a flood control project. The next question at
issue was whether this suit fell under the discretionary function exemption
in Federal Tort Claims Act, which provided immunity from liability. The
Court again found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that this was not a
discretionary function case; the Army Corps of Engineers did not make a
policy choice not to maintain the canal adequately, but rather did so out of
negligence.
The National Environmental Policy Act had obligated the Army
Corps of Engineers to update the environmental impact statement for
MRGO to reflect significant new conditions, and their failure to do so
constituted a breach of duty. The District Court awarded $750,000 in
damages to the five bellwether plaintiffs. With thousands or tens of
thousands of similarly situated plaintiffs, this could easily amount to
billions of dollars, and the Army Corps of Engineers appealed. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, allowing the lawsuit to proceed.
This decision opened up a completely new avenue of liability
litigation against the providers of infrastructure, as well as the designers
and builders of structures that do not withstand foreseeable events. When
the Army Corps of Engineers moved for an en banc hearing, though, the
Fifth Circuit reversed itself, treating the motion as a rehearing and
unanimously changing the disposition. With barely an acknowledgement
or explanation, the three members of the original panel issued a decision
48 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Latimore v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013) (mem.).
49 Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in THE
LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 235, 247 (Michael B. Gerrard &
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).
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holding the exact opposite of their previous decision on the issue of
sovereign immunity. Following the Comer case, this next internal reversal
of the Fifth Circuit only generated more curiosity. The Supreme Court
denied the writ of certiorari challenging the Fifth Circuit's decision on June
24, 2013.o
Although this case has presently exited the legal stage, it has
successfully created an air of credibility concerning the liability for
infrastructure providers and building designers. In contrast to the long list
of difficulties and obstacles that pertain to the common law nuisance cases,
there is a much shorter list for this type of liability litigation. These cases
are not against greenhouse gas emitters, and thus do not depend on a
showing that any particular event was caused by greenhouse gas emissions
or by any party in particular. Here, the burden of proof pertains merely to
whether this kind of weather event was foreseeable to the builders or
designers of infrastructure, and whether they had a duty to take precautions.
For governmental defendants, there will still be a sovereign
immunity issue. Every state has its own tort claims act and every state has
its own way of interpreting the discretionary function exemption.
Therefore, much to the disappointment of private architects, engineers,
builders and so forth, it remains to be seen on an individual basis how each
state will resolve the issue. There also remains the question of who has the
ability to sue, that is to say, who owes a duty to whom. But despite these
issues, this remains an area ripe to become a major and growing subject of
litigation, and where there is litigation, there are, of course, claims for
insurance coverage.
In closing, climate change will remain a motivation for litigation in
our court system. Through Mass. v. EPA and many state and municipal
actions, climate change has gained legitimacy as a source of harm and a
cause of action. In this next phase of our evolving, societal reckoning with
our changing world, litigation will surely focus on the responsibility of
public and private parties to adapt to our new normal, the realities of a
climate changing world.
so In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Latimore v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2855 (2013) (mem.). See
also Willis Hon, Field Report, 5th Circuit Reverses Itself on Hurricane Katrina
Liability Lawsuit, COLUM. J. ENVTL. L., (2013).
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